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Afterbirth: The Supreme Court’s Ruling in
Young v. UPS Leaves Many Questions
Unanswered
(https://verdict.justia.com/wp

content/uploads/2013/11/scotus_building.jpg) As we wrote in Part One
(https://verdict.justia.com/2015/03/31/forcepsdeliverythesupremecourt
narrowlysavesthepregnancydiscriminationactinyoungvups) of this series, the

Supreme Court just ruled, by a vote of 63, that Peggy Young, a pregnant UPS driver who
was denied a lightduty accommodation that was routinely made available to other
employees with similar lifting restrictions, should have the opportunity to prove on
remand that this denial was discriminatory.
In this case, Young v. UPS (https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/575/12
1226/) , the Court considered the proper scope of the second clause of the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 (“PDA”), a law that has opened workplace doors to pregnant
women but has faltered in the last decade under a series of narrow rulings by lower
federal courts. The second clause states that employers shall treat pregnant employees
the same as those “not so affected” but “similar in their ability or inability to work.”
Young argued that UPS’s policy, which permitted lightduty accommodations to workers
who were injured on the job, who were covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act, or
who lost their DOT certification, violated this clause because it did not allow the same
accommodation for her.
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/04/20/afterbirththesupremecourtsrulinginyoungvupsleavesmanyquestionsunanswered
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The Court rejected Young’s claim that she was entitled to the same accommodations
provided to any other similarly restricted workers, but also rejected UPS’s argument that
all “pregnancyblind” policies were valid. Instead, it ruled that secondclause claims
should be handled under the McDonnell Douglas proof structure, in which courts
examine employer actions for evidence of discrimination. By pointing to a policy that
provided accommodations to some similarly restricted workers, but not to pregnant
women, Young had satisfied the prima facie case of discrimination. The burden now falls
on UPS—at trial on remand—to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
refusal to accommodate Young’s pregnancybased lifting restriction. And when it
attempts to do so, the majority wrote, it cannot use cost or convenience as an excuse. At
the final stage, the fact finder must decide whether the employer’s reasons are sufficiently
weighty given the burden on pregnant women in that workforce. If not, the imbalance can
give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination—and a violation of the PDA.
This ruling restores important protections under the PDA that lower courts had
eviscerated, but it also leaves many questions unanswered. We explored some of these
questions in the first part of this series—namely, how many comparators must be eligible
for an accommodation before the PDA’s right of comparative accommodation is
triggered, what justifications for denying pregnant women accommodations will
constitute “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons,” and what proof might suffice to show
pretext. But those are only the tip of the iceberg. We explore here two additional
questions: (1) How will the McDonnell Douglas proof structure operate in this context;
and (2) what is the impact of the Court’s refusal to follow the EEOC’s interpretation of the
second clause of the PDA?
“Direct” Versus “Indirect” Evidence: An Unhelpful (and Unnecessary)
Dichotomy
In the Young opinion, the Court persists in a puzzling separation between direct and
indirect evidence, distinguishing a method that relies on socalled “direct” evidence of
discrimination from an “indirect” method that relies on the McDonnell Douglas pretext
proof structure to smoke out discrimination. It is perplexing that the Court is so bent on
categorizing evidence as either direct or indirect, with consequences for the applicable
proof model flowing from the categorization.
Years ago in Desert Palace v. Costa
(https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/539/90/) (2003), discussed here
(http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/grossman/20030617.html) , the Court rightly

recognized that direct evidence was not necessary to invoke the mixedmotive proof
model for proving discrimination. This method, which was introduced in the Court’s 1989
opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/04/20/afterbirththesupremecourtsrulinginyoungvupsleavesmanyquestionsunanswered
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(https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/490/228/) , and codified in the 1991

Amendments to Title VII, allows a discrimination plaintiff to hold an employer liable for
discrimination as long as the protected characteristic, such as sex or pregnancy, was a
motivating factor in the employer’s decision to take adverse action. The employer might
avoid paying money damages if it can show it would have taken the same action even
apart from reliance on the protected characteristic, but it would still be liable for
injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees.
Since Costa, both direct and indirect evidence have been permitted to support a finding
that the plaintiff’s protected class status was a “motivating factor” for the decision. Prior
to that decision, case law in the lower courts often used “direct evidence” as the
gatekeeper for accessing the mixed motive framework, with confusing and incoherent
results. Their efforts illustrated the futility of such labels in discrimination cases. It is
hard to envision what would “directly” prove the employer’s reason for acting. Anything
short of an admission in litigation requires some set of inferences to prove the ultimate
question. As a result, lower courts spent much ink and labored rationalizations in
unsuccessfully attempting to coherently walk that line. Reviving a significance in the
classification of evidence as either “direct” or “indirect” for purposes of pregnancy
discrimination claims does not strike us as a good idea. Nor is it necessary. It has long
been clear that both indirect and direct evidence can support a finding of pretext through
the McDonnell Douglas method, so there is no reason to label a piece of evidence one or
the other.
The Court’s insistence on parsing direct and indirect evidence here seems to be window
dressing to justify channeling PDA secondclause claims through the McDonnell Douglas
proof method, instead of a onestep inquiry that would reveal pregnancy discrimination
simply from the employer’s policies treating pregnancy different from many other
conditions. Filtering claims like Young’s through the McDonnell Douglas method is a
cumbersome way of proving disparate treatment in this kind of claim, which largely rests
on the different treatment of pregnancy from other conditions affecting ability to work.
As we explain below, however, the pretext model can—however meanderingly—ultimately
reach the kind of disparate treatment of pregnancy that the second clause of the PDA
prohibits. But labeling evidence as either “direct” or “indirect” does not advance the
inquiry, nor should it interfere with the plaintiff’s ability to prove discrimination. Any
evidence, direct or indirect, may support an inference that the employer’s reason is a
pretext for discrimination.
Intent as the Differential Treatment of Pregnancy—Not as Conscious Animus
A disturbing trend in recent discrimination cases has been to turn the search for
intentional discrimination into a search for animus—rather than simply deeming
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/04/20/afterbirththesupremecourtsrulinginyoungvupsleavesmanyquestionsunanswered
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differential treatment to be discrimination, as Title VII clearly provides. This opinion
does take care not to turn the search for discrimination into a search for a subjective
mindset of animus, but its language has the potential for misinterpretation. Hopefully the
Court’s use of the McDonnell Douglas proof structure will not inadvertently lead lower
courts to require proof of hostility or bias towards pregnant women; properly understood,
the Court’s framework enables proof of differential treatment to violate the statute.
Although the Court does describe the ultimate issue as whether the plaintiff’s protected
trait “actually motivated” the employer, the opinion as a whole makes clear that this does
not mean animus, but the mere fact of different treatment. A policy might cover all health
conditions employees may have except for pregnancy, not because the employer has
animus against pregnancy as a condition or against workers who become pregnant, but
simply because the employer never thought about pregnancy at all. Under the Court’s
opinion, that policy would violate the statute even if it was passed out of indifference as
opposed to animus. The Court describes the ultimate issue as turning on “whether the
nature of the employer’s policy and the way in which it burdens pregnant women shows
that the employer has engaged in intentional discrimination.” As this passage makes
clear, the intentional discrimination comes from the employer’s treatment of pregnancy;
the decision maker’s subjective feelings toward pregnancy—hostile or amiable—are not
the touchstone.
Treatment of Impact? Making Sense of the Court’s “Balancing” as a
Disparate Treatment Claim
The majority in Young wrote that a pregnancy discrimination plaintiff may convince a
jury of pretext by showing “that the employer’s policies impose a significant burden on
pregnant workers, and that the employer’s legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons are not
sufficiently strong to justify the burden, but rather—when considered along with the
burden imposed—give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.” In his dissent,
Justice Scalia accuses the majority, in crafting this approach, of “bungl[ing] the
dichotomy between claims of disparate treatment and claims of disparate impact.” On
first glance, the majority’s standard, by weighing the strength of the employer’s
justifications against the burden on pregnant women, does sound like it blurs the
distinction between treatment and impact models. But the division between impact and
treatment claims is not as stark as the dissent makes it sound. Nor should it be.
Courts have often understood the impact of a practice or policy on a protected group,
combined with the lack of any persuasive justification for it, as part of the case for
inferring intentional discrimination. In one case challenging a newly implemented
strength test, in what might have been only a challenge to the test’s disparate impact on
women, the lower court noted that the utter lack of a justification for the test and the
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/04/20/afterbirththesupremecourtsrulinginyoungvupsleavesmanyquestionsunanswered
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negative effect on hiring women indicated an intent to discriminate on the part of the
employer. Likewise, in one challenge to a broad “Englishonly” rule in the workplace,
another lower court found the effect on Latino and Latino workers, given the lack of a
business rationale to justify the broadly prohibitory policy, to support a claim for
intentional discrimination. While these are unusual cases, to be sure, the point is that
discrimination in the real workplace does not always precisely align with the crisp
categorical boxes of disparate treatment and impact. Discrimination law should not be so
formalistic as to insist on a clear line of distinction that does not exist.
Most importantly, the Court’s balancing approach, in this setting, is designed to capture
the kind of intentional discrimination that is behind discriminatory refusals to
accommodate pregnancy. Historically, as employers found it useful or necessary to
accommodate other kinds of employee conditions, they left pregnant workers out of these
reforms. They did so not out of a conscious animus toward pregnant workers by and
large, but based on implicit stereotypes about the value of workers who become pregnant,
and then mothers. When Congress passed the PDA, it had abundant evidence that
employers judged pregnant workers less worthy of the kinds of investments in human
capital made in other workers. Workers on the verge of motherhood were assumed to
leave the workplace entirely, or reduce their commitment to paid labor. Because of this
kind of stereotyping, employer policies reflexively treated pregnancy differently, despite
similarity in workers’ present ability to work.
While a clean sourceofcondition rule would have been a simpler way to define disparate
treatment in this setting, the majority was unprepared to rule out the possibility that
employers might have sufficient reasons for treating some classes of workers more
favorably than pregnant employees. Having not taken that path, the Court had to decide
how to give meaning to the Act’s second clause, which specifies the baseline for
identifying the comparison class for defining disparate treatment based on pregnancy.
The second clause was meant to solve the analogic crisis of pregnancy—the fact that there
is nothing quite like pregnancy with which to compare—by specifying the proper
comparison group. However, since it specifies “other persons” without clearly indicating
which persons, the Court crafted a standard designed to sniff out when treating some, but
not all, nonpregnant persons more favorably amounts to the kind of disparate treatment
clause two addresses.
Might this foretell a broader rethinking of the categories of impact and treatment claims,
and a further softening of the lines between them? Probably not. The majority opinion
takes care to limit its adaptation of the pretext model here to PDA claims only. While
there is, no doubt, some interpretation going on here to connect the secondclause
guarantee of equal treatment to the kinds of fact patterns arising in cases like Young, it is
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/04/20/afterbirththesupremecourtsrulinginyoungvupsleavesmanyquestionsunanswered
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a far cry from the “poof” of magic wands that the dissent conjures up.
After all the backandforth between the majority and dissent about whether this is really
a disparate impact or a disparate treatment claim, the key question in the end is the one
the majority asks at the end of the opinion: “why, when the employer accommodated so
many, could it not accommodate pregnant women as well?” That has always been the
concern that the PDA was enacted to address. We expect that the majority’s proof model
for secondclausetype claims will do a better job of answering that question than the
lower courts have managed to do so far.
The EEOC’s Power to Persuade
As mentioned above, the Court in Young rejected the plaintiff’s interpretation of the
second clause of the PDA, which would have found a per se violation of the statute
whenever an employer provided for accommodations for some workers, but denied them
to similarly restricted pregnant women. This was not just a theory she invented. It is
supported by the plain text of the statute. Moreover, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, the agency charged with implementing Title VII, took that exact position in
its formal pregnancy discrimination guidelines. Although the Supreme Court sometimes
takes agency interpretations into account, it refused to do so here. The guidelines did not,
in the Court’s view, have the power to persuade.
The Court’s disrespect for the EEOC’s position stems from its conclusion that the most
recent guidelines were enacted after the Court granted the petition for certiorari in this
case. They thus seemed strategic rather than reasoned, to the majority anyway. The
reality is that the EEOC has taken a consistent approach to pregnancy accommodation
since even before the PDA was enacted. Regulations adopted in 1972 provided that
“[d]isabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy . . . are, for all jobrelated purposes,
temporary disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary
disability insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment.” And
postPDA guidance was consistent with this early statement and added the additional
clarification that “[i]f other employees temporarily unable to lift are relieved of these
functions, pregnant employees also unable to lift must be temporarily relieved of the
function.” But, in the Court’s view, this guidance did not resolve the question posed in
Young—whether a pregnant employee is entitled to an accommodation offered to any
other employee, or only to those offered to numerous other employees. In the majority’s
view, this
“postAct guidance . . . does not resolve the ambiguity of the term ‘other persons’ in the
Act’s second clause. Rather, it simply tells employers to treat pregnancyrelated
disabilities like nonpregnancyrelated disabilities, without clarifying how that instruction
https://verdict.justia.com/2015/04/20/afterbirththesupremecourtsrulinginyoungvupsleavesmanyquestionsunanswered
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should be implemented when an employer does not treat all nonpregnancyrelated
disabilities alike.”
The EEOC’s more recent guidance—promulgated in July 2014—does address this
question specifically, providing that “[a]n employer may not refuse to treat a pregnant
worker the same as other employees who are similar in their ability or inability to work by
relying on a policy that makes distinctions based on the source of an employee’s
limitations (e.g., a policy of providing light duty only to workers injured on the job).” 2
EEOC Compliance Manual § 626–I(A)(5), p. 626:0009 (July 2014). Examples make clear
that the EEOC would have required UPS to grant someone like Peggy Young a lightduty
accommodation given that it made the same accommodation to other employees with a
different source of injury. It is this interpretation that the Young majority refused to
follow because it found difficulties with timing, consistency, and thoroughness of the
agency’s consideration of the issue. In part, it was troubled by the fact that the federal
government has taken a different position when defending itself against a pregnancy
discrimination claim in court.
This rejection of the EEOC’s position merits three brief notes. First, it is hardly fair to
attribute the government’s selfserving litigation position (in a case, Ensley–Gaines v.
Runyon (http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate
courts/F3/100/1220/475796/) , in which a postal service workers sued for pregnancy

discrimination) to the agency in its rulemaking and administrative enforcement capacity.
Inconsistency is to be expected between those two very different contexts, and from
different departments of government. Second, the EEOC’s clarification in July 2014 was
not in any way contrary to the interpretation it has urged since the PDA’s initial passage—
and its position on pregnancy discrimination even before 1978. While it did address a
specific example at issue in the Young case, that same issue had been the centerpiece of
several federal appellate decisions dating back almost twenty years. Third, the Court’s
decision not to follow the interpretation suggested in one example should not undermine
the rest of the EEOC’s pregnancy discrimination guidance, which provides a
comprehensive interpretation of the PDA. All but the one sentence mentioned above
should continue to have the full force of an agency interpretation.
Conclusion
It is not uncommon for the Supreme Court’s employment discrimination rulings to invite
more litigation, and the Young v. UPS ruling is no exception. The Court, however, has set
the stage for broader protection for pregnant workers—and a more disciplined approach
to ensuring their rights under the PDA are enforced.
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